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1. Introduction 
 
“Where the ‘model bureau’ does not exist, it is obviously futile to ask questions 
about what does exist as though it were a ‘model bureau.’ The first task is not to 
make this assumption, but to ask: ‘What does in fact exist?’ One may discover, of 
course, that what exists is not at all a bad thing.” 
 
Fred Riggs, Public Administration in Developing Countries, p. 9 
 
 
In China, even within a county government, some agencies are evidently more 
privileged than others. The Construction Bureau is a clear example of the “haves.” In a 
county I visited in Shandong province, the Construction Bureau was one among few 
public agencies to possess and to occupy its own building, separate from the main 
government facility that was overcrowded with other departments. 1  Whereas other 
agencies I interviewed complained about financial pressures and occasional wage arrears, 
only the Chief of the Construction Bureau confidently declared, “We don’t have such 
problems in the construction cluster. Others do, but we are fine” (B2011-275). Indeed, 
the Construction bureau boasts a fleet of money-making extra-bureaucracies (including a 
greening office, construction management office, rural construction management office, 
construction materials assessment center, construction design institute, and real estate 
development company, to name some), which are all public entities, but operate like 
private, profit-making contractors. As the Construction Bureau Chief stated, “If our 
subsidiaries make money, they can pay themselves. The county government does not pay 
them. After deducting costs from revenue, the surpluses belong to them.” Employees of 
                                                          
1 This article draws on interviews with over 284 local cadres, conducted between 2006 and 2011. 
To maintain the anonymity of these interviewees, I do not identify their name or specific location. 
Instead, I cite interviews by the year in which the first interview was conducted, followed by an ID 
assigned to the interviewee. Information about the distribution of these interviews and the 
implementation procedures is contained in a methodological appendix (see OMIT 2016, 
Appendix B).   
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the Construction Bureau and its extra-bureaucracies were among the best-paid in the 
county.  
The bureaucracy described above contradicts a key principle of public 
administration. According to Weber, public organizations should not command 
“ownership of the means of production or administration” (1968, pp. 218-219). In other 
words, public agencies are not supposed to “own” the income they generate. Any revenue 
collected, such as regulatory fees and user charges, must be turned over to the state 
treasury, and then public revenue would be reallocated based on formal budgetary rules. 
Within a government, we do not expect to see some agencies enjoying more staff benefits 
and more lavish furnishing than others simply because they generate more income. And 
yet, in China, it is openly acknowledged that financial disparity across agencies exists at 
all levels of government. These public agencies behaved literally like entrepreneurial 
companies.  
If the bureaucracy that one finds in China appears inconsistent with Weberian 
norms, should we conclude that this bureaucracy is corrupt or dysfunctional?  
Many observers subscribe to a binary view of public administration: if an 
organization does not fit conventional gold standards—the Weberian model—then it 
must be defective, rather than simply different.2 China observers, too, have based their 
evaluation of organizational efficacy on Weberian norms. For example, Xiaobo Lu 
applies the blanket label of “organizational corruption” to the self-financing behavior of 
Chinese bureaucracies. Taking the Weberian model as his reference point, Lu sums up 
the nature of China’s bureaucracy critically, “Rather than the effective, coherent, and 
omnipotent bureaucracies some scholars once attributed to them, they had become… 
more approximate to what Weber described as patrimonial officialdom” (Lu, 2000, p. 
290).  
Likewise, cross-national indices adopt a single set of benchmarks. For instance, 
Evans and Rauch measure the quality of bureaucracies in developing countries according 
                                                          
2 This assumption is also prevalent in the historical study of non-Western societies, as Victoria 
Hui sharply notes, “When we take the European experience as the norm and non-Western 
experiences as abnormal, we are led to ‘search for what went wrong in other parts of the world’” 
(Hui, 2005, p. 9; see also Wong, 1997, p. 210).  
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to their adherence to Weberian precepts of organization, or what the authors term 
“Weberian-ness” (1999; 2000). The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is another 
prominent example. Issued annually by the World Bank, the WGI ranks the quality of 
governance across countries on a continuous scale from the best—benchmarked by 
countries like the U.S., Denmark, and Finland—to the worst.3 By itself, this measure 
implies that any variance from the standards of the developed countries is a negative 
deviance.  
When there is only one ideal-type in place, we may only perceive variance as 
differences in degree, rather than as categorical differences in type (OMIT, 2016, p. Chap 
1).  Failing to recognize categorical differences poses serious policy and practical 
implications. In the context of psychology, it would be like measuring human intelligence 
according to a single benchmark of how well one scores on standard IQ tests, ignoring all 
other types of intelligence not captured by such numerical tests. 4  In public 
administration, measuring the quality of bureaucracy only by Weberian standards would 
mean that all deviations found in developing countries—such as the prevalence of 
personal relations and self-financing (or what Weber termed prebendal) practices—are 
perceived as defects that must be immediately abolished and replaced by best practices 
from the West. Yet numerous studies show that the implantation of best practices often 
does not fit the context of developing countries and has even backfired, creating a 
stubborn dissonance between formal rules and actual practices (Andrews, 2013; Riggs, 
1964; Rodrik, 2007). 
To advance the study of public administration in developing countries and to 
formulate meaningful reforms, we need to first conceptualize more than one ideal-type 
of bureaucracy. Without such an alternative, we may only conceive of institutional 
features in developing contexts as “Weberian” or “not Weberian” (or in the analogy of 
psychology, as “smart” or “dumb”). Lacking such an alternative, we cannot even 
                                                          
3 The WGI includes six dimensions: voice and accountability; political stability; regulatory quality; 
government effectiveness; rule of law; control of corruption (Apaza, 2009). 
4 On the theory of multiple intelligences that has revolutionized education practices, see (Gardner, 
1983). 
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accurately describe the many anomalies observed in developing contexts. As Riggs writes 
over half a century ago, “Can we identify the kind of transitional administrative system 
that exists today in reality? I think we can, but to do so we shall have to employ some 
new words and concepts which cannot be found in the standard literature on public 
administration” (1964, p. 10). This objective of this article is precisely to introduce these 
“new words and concepts” by outlining an alternative ideal-type of bureaucracy found in 
China.  
The model of bureaucracy witnessed in China is essentially a regulated and 
relatively disciplined variant of prebendal public administration. Following Weber, a 
prebendal administration is one that finances itself through extraction (such as by 
exacting fees), rather than receives stable budget appropriations from the state. This 
description alone would lead us to cast prebendalism as corruption because an 
administration that finances itself through extraction must be susceptible to abuses of 
power. That is true. I submit, however, that there are distinct advantages to 
prebendalism that have been overlooked—akin to franchising (or contracting), 
prebendalism is a high-powered incentive scheme, wherein public agents are highly 
motivated to finance themselves. Of course, in developed countries, there is no need for 
public agencies to do so because governments can afford to pay them. Conversely, in 
developing countries and among local governments in China, budgetary shortages are 
the norm. In this context, public agents who are motivated to self-finance actually 
presents an advantage. The internal rules of revenue-generation and budgeting within 
the Chinese bureaucracy were evolved to incentivize self-financing while mitigating its 
risks.  
To interpret the Chinese case in generic organizational terms, I apply concepts 
from neo-institutional economics. Following the classic work of Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975), neo-institutional economists posit two alternative modes of 
organizations: markets vs. hierarchies. As they indicate, neither of these two models is 
inherently superior to the other; whichever model is better depends on the type of 
transactions involved. Extending this logic to public administrations, the Weberian 
model is not always the best. Advanced market economies require predictable, non-
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extractive administration, so the Weberian model is ideal. Developing and transitional 
economies, on the other hand, require bureaucracies that can finance their own 
operations entrepreneurially and take initiative and risks to address new problems that 
emerge during transition. Particular to this context, China presents an alternative ideal-
type of bureaucracy that I term bureau-franchising, the hybrid of a hierarchical 
appointment structure with the high-powered incentives of franchising (or contracting).  
 The rest of the article will proceed as follows. Applying a neo-institutional 
framework, the next section will lay out the distinction between the Weberian and 
bureau-franchising ideal-type. In this section, I will also underscore the important 
differences between New Public Management (i.e., reforms to introduce corporate 
practices into public administrations in Western developed countries) and China’s 
bureaucratic practices. Then I will detail four concrete features of bureau-franchising, 
drawing on extensive interviews. And finally, I will conclude with questions for further 
research.  
 
 
2. Two Ideal-Types of Public Bureaucracy  
 
2.1. The Weberian Ideal-Type 
In his incisive study of the modernization processes taking place in Western 
Europe, Weber pointed to the emergence of a new bureaucratic species and ideal-type. In 
contrast to pre-modern institutions of governance, modern bureaucracies are “legal-
rational.” As Weber observes, such organizations are rules-bound, specialized, 
hierarchical, meritocratic, and above all, salaried. To be salaried means that civil 
servants receive sufficient and regular wages from state budget allocations—in exchange, 
they are barred from exploiting the prerogatives of office for personal gain (such as by 
taking bribes or pocketing public revenue). In Weber terms, modern public officials are 
not allowed to have “ownership of the means of production or administration” (1968, pp. 
218-219). 
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 Although the legal-rational and salaried characteristics of bureaucracy are taken-
for-granted among scholars of public administration in developed countries, it is worth 
reminding that such qualities are a recent novelty in the long history of human 
development.5 As Weber points out from a historical perspective, state bureaucracies 
were for centuries patrimonial (governed on the basis of personal relationships and 
loyalties) and prebendal (self-financed through rents extraction). Imperial governments 
and feudal lords rarely paid public servants regular wages for their services. Instead, 
political agents were assigned “prebends”—licenses to extract rents from public office as 
“forms of maintenance.” Prebendalism was practiced throughout Chinese history (Zelin, 
1984). Up until the late Qing dynasty, as one historian describes, “Salaries failed to cover 
the real costs of obtaining and holding office, [and] officials, as a matter of course, 
resorted to collecting fees (guifei or lougui) from their subordinates or the people in 
their jurisdictions” (Hickey, 1991, p. 389). 
While contemporary observers would instinctively equate prebendalism with 
corruption, such practices in fact offered certain advantages in the context of pre-
modern governance. Weber explains that the absence of a stable tax collection system 
and a sufficiently monetized economy made it too burdensome for rulers to pay 
administrators regular wages in money. Instead, by allowing officials to finance 
themselves through prebends, “the lord can transfer the trouble of transforming his 
income-in-kind into money-income to the officer-farmer” (1968, p. 965). Restated in 
modern language, he means that instead of operating an in-house bureaucracy, it was 
more cost-effective for rulers to outsource public administration to individual 
contractors.   
But though prebendal arrangements presented certain advantages, they posed 
obvious risks too. Given that prebendal officials were allowed to keep a share of income 
generated through the exercise of public duties, they had incentives to maximize 
extraction. Consequently, this provoked regular spells of over-taxation and popular 
                                                          
5 Prebendal practices were also the norm in England and the United States up until the early 
twentieth century (Brewer, 1988; Parrillo, 2013). 
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rebellion. Furthermore, extraction in prebendal administrations was rarely constrained 
by laws. Instead, it rested on the whims of lords and officials, making demands for 
payment unpredictable to entrepreneurs and subjects. These conditions undermined the 
expansion of modern states and markets.  
Hence, as Weber famously posits, the rise of modern capitalism requires legal-
rational bureaucracy as a foundation. Consistent with this claim, cross-national studies 
report a strong correlation between the “Weberian-ness” of public administrations and 
the level of economic wealth (Evans & Rauch, 1999). Case studies of the East Asian 
developmental states maintain that effective state promotion of the economy required 
the establishment of Weberian agencies as a precondition (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; 
Kohli, 2004; Wade, 1990). Weberian features are still regarded as an essential element of 
state capacity (Centeno, Kohli, & Yashar, 2016). These modern interpretations of 
Weber’s theory reiterate the belief there is indeed only one ideal-type of bureaucracy, 
against which all other bureaucracies are evaluated.  
Yet a closer reading of Weber’s essays reveals a more nuanced perspective that 
Weber himself seems keenly aware—although the characteristics of the Weberian model 
fit the demands of modern industrialized markets particularly well, the Weberian model 
may not be ideal in all environments. To understand this point, it is useful to re-interpret 
the Weberian model in abstract neo-institutional terms: transactions, incentives, and 
risks.  
 
2.2. Interpreting the Weberian Model in Neo-Institutional Terms 
 Neo-institutional economics (also known as “the new economics of organization”) 
takes contracts as the starting point of organizational analyses (Moe, 1984). Ronald 
Coase’s (1937) classic theory of the firm asks why some transactions take place in the 
market between firms and others within a firm. In other words, Coase puzzled over the 
relative value of market transactions over internal authority structures. The answer 
proposed by Williamson (1975) is transaction costs—that is, difficulties that arise in 
completing transactions. One common transaction costs takes the form of opportunism. 
Individuals may seek to benefit from an exchange at the expense of the other party 
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through deception or concealment. Opportunism is, as Williamson defines, “a lack of 
candor or honesty in transactions… [or] self-interest seeking with guile” (1975, p. 9).   
According to the neo-institutional framework, there is an inherent trade-off 
between market transactions and authority structures. This is sharply illustrated by a 
comparison of two corporate models: direct ownership vs. corporate franchising. 
Franchising approximates a market-based transaction. For example, McDonald’s is a 
franchise that contracts the right to operate its fast-food stores to a network of 
franchisees, private entrepreneurs who are entitled to keep a share of profits generated 
by their individually owned stores. Direct ownership is a hierarchical model, in which a 
company hires salaried managers to operate its stores, as seen in Comet Coffee, a small, 
locally-owned coffee shop in Ann Arbor. As Comet Coffee’s employees do not claim a 
share of profits earned, they are less likely than McDonald’s franchisees to be strongly 
motivated to earn profits. However, salaried employees in directly owned companies are 
less likely to “game” the headquarters to maximize their personal gain. It is also easier to 
directly monitor and control employees than franchisees, who own the stores they 
manage.  
Stated generically, whereas market transactions offer the advantage of high-
powered incentives, hierarchical structures offer the benefit of lower risks. Market 
transactions—as exemplified by franchising—supply high powered incentives insofar as 
efficiency gains flow directly to the transacting parties in the form of retained profits. 
Authority structures—as in the case of direct ownership—supply low powered incentives 
as employees benefit only indirectly from the organization’s financial gains, such as 
through promotions or pay raises. However, market exchanges pose a greater risk of 
opportunism, whereas authority relations provide more control and predictability.  
In other words, neo-institutional theories make clear that neither the market-
based nor hierarchical mode of organization is inherently superior. Whichever model is 
preferable depends on the goals and constraints of a given organization and its tolerance 
for risks. Can the neo-institutional argument about corporations extend to the public 
sector? Moving on, I will demonstrate that the Weberian model is not the only ideal-type 
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of bureaucracy, but rather one of two ideal-types that each presents different pros and 
cons.6  
 
2.3. Bureau-Franchising: An Alternative Ideal-Type  
To picture the Weberian ideal-type in contrast to the bureau-franchising model, I 
begin by disaggregating two types of transactions in the public sector: financial and 
personnel relations, as illustrated in Figure 1. Financial relations concern whether a 
government funds public service providers with high-powered contracting rights (market) 
or low-powered fixed budget allocations (hierarchy). Personnel relations concern 
whether a service provider relates to the government in the role of a private contractor 
(market) or a public employee appointed within the political apparatus (hierarchy).  
[Insert Figure 1] 
The two dimensions of financial and personnel contractual relations generate 
four configurations of public sector organization. (1) The top left quadrant is private 
contracting, involving purely market-based financial and personnel transactions. Private 
contractors are entitled to profits earned from the provision of public services. (2) The 
bottom right quadrant represents public bureaucracy, staffed by public employees whose 
salaries are paid through budget allocations. (3) The top right corner captures some 
forms of state enterprises, in which employees are not directly appointed by the 
government but are paid fixed wages regardless of the firm’s performance. (4) Finally, 
the bottom left corner is what I term bureau-franchising, which fuses market-based 
bureaucratic financing with hierarchical personnel control. In a bureau-franchising 
model, the service providers are public employees. Yet partly like private contractors, 
they can profit from the provision of administrative, regulatory, and public services.  
                                                          
6 Normally, when transaction costs theory is applied to public administration, the issue has been 
framed as a binary and formal choice that governments face between delivering public services 
through the private sector (high-powered incentives with high risks) or the public bureaucracy 
(low-powered incentives with low risks) (Acemoglu, Kremer, & Mian, 2008; Donahue, 1989; Moe, 
1984). This debate assumes a clear-cut, separate identity between private and public 
organizations, a condition common to industrialized democracies but not to developing contexts.  
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Whereas the Weberian model is an ideal-type that features low opportunistic 
risks but low-powered incentives, the bureau-franchising model offers the advantage of 
high-powered incentives but the disadvantage of high opportunistic risks, as I 
summarize in Table 1. The bureau-franchising model has clear historical precedents, as 
Weber observed. Prebendal bureaucrats were essentially entrepreneurs who delivered 
administrative services in exchange for state-assigned rights to keep a share of income 
earned.  
Prebendalism extends into the context of reform-era China but with some sharp 
departures from the past. First, the modern, authoritarian regime under the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has greater control over public personnel than previous imperial 
governments did. For example, the Qing government ruled over a vast territory with a 
remarkably small cohort of magistrates, who informally recruited local clerks and 
runners to conduct the daily tasks of governance (Reed, 2000). In modern-day China, 
civil servants and public employees of extra-bureaucracies can be clearly identified 
through a centralized personnel system, connected level by level (Landry, 2008). 7 
Second, as the economy took off during the reform period, the CCP developed higher 
capacity to monitor the transactions of rank-and-file bureaucracy, including by 
incorporating technology in daily operations, which was simply not available in the past.8 
Third, as China transitions from central planning to a market economy, there are more 
creative schemes of prebendal financing than ever imaginable during the dynastic ages.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The bureau-franchising model, as seen in contemporary China, has the advantage 
of powerfully motivating local agencies and public services providers to self-finance. This 
advantage is especially salient in the context of fiscal decentralization since 1978, in 
which local governments are expected to be responsible for financing nearly all of their 
own administrative expenses. The fiscal reform of 1994 further heightened sub-
provincial budgetary pressures. Although the 1994 reform clarified the terms of tax 
                                                          
7 For example, the dossiers of all public employees are stored in a separate dossier system, 
managed by the Personnel Management Bureau at all levels of government (B2007-126).  
8 One example is the creation of a centralized treasury management system, beginning in the 
1990s, which uses electronic technology to track public transactions (OMIT, 2009). 
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sharing between the central and provincial governments, the reform in effect 
recentralized tax revenue without adjusting local spending responsibilities (World Bank 
& State Council, 2013). The resulting dramatic shortfall in local budgets from 1994 
onward is evident in Figure 2. In addition to revenue shortages, local governments are 
also pressed by the political pressures of having to feed an ever-enlarging bureaucracy 
and deliver ever more public services. By 2007, the total number of public employees 
(excluding employees in state-owned enterprises and the military) has reached almost 49 
million, equivalent to the entire population of South Korea (OMIT, 2012). An average 
county government has to finance about 20,000 public employees. These constraints 
compelled local governments to encourage their bureaucracies to be as financially “self-
independent” as possible. It is the combination of financial pressures and newly acquired 
institutional capacities in the reform era that propelled China to maintain but at the 
same time regulate prebendal practices.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
2.4. Bureau-Franchising vs. New Public Management 
Some students of public administration in developed countries may contend that 
bureau-franchising is nothing new. The New Public Management (NPM), which rose to 
fashion in Western countries like the U.K. and New Zealand in the 1980s, had similarly 
promoted “corporate” reforms in the public sector, such as performance pay and 
contracting of public services to private actors. So on the surface, it seems that NPM and 
its variants already constitute an alternative ideal-type of bureaucracy. In fact, the two 
administrative models—bureau-franchising vs. NPM—could not be more different.  
NPM is a set of reforms tailored for developed countries that have already 
established stably-paid, Weberian bureaucracies a long time ago. NPM was introduced 
for the purposes of improving efficiency and the quality of public services (Lane, 2000). 
Performance pay under NPM entailed awarding bonuses to individual public employees 
based on the subjective evaluation of their performance, such as quality of work and 
relationship with the public, usually by supervisors (Marsden & Richardson, 1994). 
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Contracting entailed devolving public services provision to wholly private entities (Walsh, 
1995).  
By contrast, as we shall see in greater detail later, bureau-franchising was evolved 
in the context of a developing country, where local agencies are not stably and 
adequately paid and professional staff are frequently lacking. The priority of 
administration was to make ends meet (or as Chinese bureaucrats put it bluntly, to “eat”), 
to pay personnel wages and offices’ utility bills. Until such basic concerns are resolved, 
improving the quality of public services is a noble but remote concern. Performance pay 
in China entailed respective agencies taking a direct cut of income earned and 
distributing it among staff members; the criteria of performance was objectively based 
on the amount of money made, not fuzzy, warm criteria like “customer service.” And 
contracting meant devolving services provision not to private parties through a 
competitive bidding process, but to the subsidiaries of public agencies that maintain a 
patron-client rather than arms-length relationship with service providers.  
The story of bureau-franchising speaks to the unique challenges and quirky 
coping strategies of public administration in developing countries, whereas NPM are 
reforms tailored to developed countries. Indeed, as Manning concludes in a review 
article, “It is certainly commonplace for weary consultants and development agency staff 
to maintain that there is little in the NPM technical/managerial amalgam that is 
appropriate for the politicized public sectors in many developing countries (2001, p. 297). 
 
3. Four Concrete Features of Bureau-Franchising 
 
Having outlined the characteristics of the bureau-franchising model in contrast 
to the standard Weberian model, I now proceed to describe four concrete features of 
bureau-franchising, as seen in China and listed below. My findings draw on in-depth 
fieldwork and 284 interviews with street-level bureaucrats, focusing on the actual 
practices—rather than prescriptive rules—of financing among local public organizations.  
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1. A bifurcated state structure comprised of a small core of bureaus and a sprawling 
periphery of extra-bureaucracies 
2. Bureaucracies generate nontax revenue to supplement basic budget allocations 
3. Bureaucracies are sanctioned by state-legislated “policy awards” to generate 
revenue 
4. Bureaucracies exercise partial ownership rights over generated revenue  
 
3.1. Bureaus and Extra-Bureaucracies  
Existing analyses of the Chinese bureaucracy tend to feature either local 
governments as a homogeneous whole or various offices that appear on official 
organizational charts. In fact, if we disaggregate the bureaucracy further, we will find a 
bifurcated party-state structure at all levels of government, comprising a small core of 
party and state organs, termed “administrative units” (jiguan danwei) in Chinese, and a 
sprawling periphery of extra-bureaucracies or “service units” (shiye danwei). About 80 
percent of public employment is concentrated in the extra-bureaucracies. Thus, shiye 
units are rightly described as “a big shadow of the Chinese state” (Lam & Perry, 2001, p. 
20).  
Administrative units (jiguan danwei) perform the tasks of planning, 
administration, and regulation. They include party organs responsible for political affairs 
(e.g., Organization Department) and governmental organs that formulate economic and 
social policies (e.g., Finance Bureau, Public Security Bureau, Development Commission, 
and Education Bureau). In this analysis, I refer to administrative units as “core bureaus.”  
Compared to the core bureaus, shiye danwei is a poorly defined and frequently 
misunderstood entity. This Chinese term has been variously translated into “business 
units” (Barnett & Vogel, 1967), “institutional work units” (Cheng, 2001), “semi-
governmental organizations that perform social functions” (Tang & Lo, 2009), 
“government-funded not-for-profit organizations” (Yang, 2004), and “public service 
units” (World Bank, 2005). I choose to translate shiye danwei as extra-bureaucracies to 
capture its operational reality and analytic significance—all shiye danwei are attached 
and subordinated to a particular core agency. The term comes from historical studies 
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that referred to local elites and tax farmers in China who performed state services but 
who were not formally appointed officials as “extra-bureaucracies” (Rankin, 1993). 
Examples of extra-bureaucracies under various party and state bureaus are listed in 
Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2] 
In principle, extra-bureaucracies should not have regulatory powers or profit-
making motives (Cheng, 2001). But it is important to separate principle from reality. As 
Lam and Perry aptly describes, extra-bureaucracies “only provide services to their 
administrative bosses” (2001, p. 27). These services may be public or private in nature. 
Extra-bureaucracies may administer, deliver free public services, provide charge-based 
services, or a mixture of the above. Extra-bureaucracies include conventional public 
service providers like public schools and public hospitals. But they also include 
amorphous entities engaged in regulatory enforcement and semi or purely commercial 
activities.  
Extra-bureaucracies in China must be distinguished from purely private 
providers. The employees of extra-bureaucracies, termed shiye renwei, are public 
employees, who are assigned an administrative rank, whose dossiers belong in the state 
sector, and who may be transferred into the formal civil service if they hold chu-and-
above ranks. Extra-bureaucracies must also be distinguished from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and collective enterprises (Oi, 1999). These enterprises are directly 
engaged in production and are supposed to generate profits; they do not receive budget 
allocations from the government (though they may receive financial bailouts if losses are 
incurred). By contrast, extra-bureaucracies are public organizations that primarily 
provide services, rather than manufactured goods. Additionally, extra-bureaucracies 
should in principle receive regular budget allocations from the state and not pursue 
profits.9  
                                                          
9 Furthermore, extra-bureaucracies are not equivalent to bureau-operated companies, known as 
sanchan gongsi (tertiary companies)” (Lin & Zhang, 1999, p. 205). Whereas bureau-operated 
small businesses were an epi-phenomenon that faded by the early 2000s (Hubbard, 1995), extra-
bureaucracies have always been essential part of China’s party-state, even under central planning.  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
15 
 
Extra-bureaucracies are an essential component of the bureau-franchising model 
because they are, in effect, the contracting arm of the core civil service. Under the Qing 
administration, a small number of officially appointed magistrates governed a vast 
territory by contracting governing services to a large network of local and unsalaried 
“clerks and runners,” described by Reed as “talons and teeth” who “cannot be dispensed 
with even for a day (2000, p. 169). Extending history into the reform era, shiye danwei 
are the modern-day “talons and teeth.” These organizations perform a range of services 
on behalf of often-understaffed core bureaus, and they also rely on privileges and 
protections provided by the core bureaus to generate income (more details to follow 
next).  
Note that unlike private contractors featured in the NPM model of developed 
countries, extra-bureaucracies in China are unequivocally public organizations. The 
heads of shiye danwei are often appointed or nominated by the supervising core bureaus. 
Extra-bureaucracies also do not have to go through competitive bidding processes; 
instead, the delivery of public services is typically assigned by the government to them.  
 
3.2. Basic Budget Allocations vs. Extra Nontax Revenue 
Both in principle and in practice, Chinese bureaucracies are not purely salaried. 
This reality goes against textbook descriptions of public administration (Moe, 1984, p. 
763):  
 
The typical bureau receives a budget from governmental superiors and spends all 
of it supplying services to a nonpaying clientele. Regardless of the agency’s 
performance or how it changes over time, the results are not reflected in an 
economic surplus accruing to bureau heads. 
 
For example, in the U.S., the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) expects to receive 
most if not all its income from state budget appropriations. DMVs collect fees, but the 
revenue that it collects is channeled to the state treasury, not to the departments’ own 
coffers. Hence, DMVs do not have the profit incentives of corporations, as James Wilson 
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states matter-of-factly: “A McDonald’s manager can estimate the marginal product of the 
last dollar he or she spends on improving service; the Registry manager can generate no 
tangible return on any expenditure he or she makes” (1989, p. 135). 
Whereas the norm in America is that nearly all public bureaucracies are fully 
state-funded, China’s bureaucracies are formally divided into three fiscal categories: 
fully-funded, partially-funded, and self-funded. Fully-funded units receive full state 
funding for basic budgetary needs; partially-funded units receive some financial 
subsidies from the government; self-funded units receive none and are expected to 
generate their entire income. Nationwide, as summarized in Table 3, about 5 percent of 
public employees are entirely self-funded, while the remainder is partially or fully self-
funded. Table 1 lists examples of extra-bureaucracies by funding type.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Budget allocations from the state usually cover only essential budgetary needs, 
excluding staff benefits and frills. As one official from the Finance Bureau stated 
metaphorically, “Budget allocations are used to deliver coals during snow, not to add 
blossoms to silk” (B2008-154). Typically, being “fully state funding” guarantees that only 
basic operational costs and staff wages are covered. Thus, even fully-funded units like 
public schools and regulatory agencies often come under financial stress. Furthermore, it 
is not unusual that nominally state-funded units receive no budget allocations in practice. 
For example, I encountered a city-level Tourism Bureau that was supposed to be a fully-
funded agency, but was in fact entirely self-financed by the remittance of income from its 
cluster of extra-bureaucracies until 2001 (B2007-108).  
For bureaucracies to disburse staff bonuses, allowances, and benefits, or to 
construct new office buildings, they would have to generate extra income, which takes 
the form of “nontax revenue” (feishui shouru). Whereas taxes are collected by the 
national and local tax agencies, according to national tax laws, nontax revenue is a 
residual category of public finance. The Chinese term feishui literally means “revenue 
other than taxes.” Nontax revenue is collected in a decentralized manner by bureaus and 
extra-bureaucracies of all stripes. Table 4 list six categories of nontax revenue, with fees, 
fines, and user charges being the most common.  
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[Insert Table 4] 
Let me describe examples of nontax revenue in the construction sector, which is a 
notoriously “greasy” segment of the bureaucracy. The Construction Bureau is enriched 
by collecting a wide array of regulatory fees. This Finance Officer described (B2008-140),  
 
The Construction Bureau collects so many fees! Inspection fees, construction fees, 
proxy fees, bidding fees, monitoring fees. Whenever a state agency can issue 
approvals, it is greased. Monitoring fees, have you heard of that? This is collected 
by an extra-bureaucracy under the Construction Bureau. Bundled services fees, 
have you heard of that? Fees for providing a bundle of services: fire protection, 
electricity, and heating. Last but not least, lightning rod fee, have you heard of 
that?  
 
It appears that even in wealthy localities, all bureaucracies generate varying amounts of 
nontax revenue. When I asked a Finance Officer whether there were any “purely” state-
funded agencies in his county, he responded with revealing hesitation (B2007-114): 
 
Pure ones? Almost none… Organizations in the judicial system [such as courts] 
should be pure… but wait… Actually, even they are not completely pure. Well, 
then are those in the local party committee and government secretariat. Their 
financial needs should be guaranteed… But then again, those are not entirely 
pure too. 
 
The important question is: how do bureaucracies generate nontax revenue to 
finance themselves? Are they bound by any rules? Importantly, whether at the central or 
local levels, the government has an interest in seeing that individual agencies self-finance 
without resorting to lawless extortion. Hence, the state assigns what I call policy 
awards—revenue-making privileges—to its bureaucracy, which we examine in the next 
section.  
 
3.3. Policy Awards that License Self-Financing 
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A popular saying in China goes: “the state may not be able to give money, but it 
can grant policies.” What does this mean? One officer explained, “Giving policies not 
money happens when the government wants to get something done but budgetary funds 
are insufficient” (B2008-152). Put simply, policy awards are privileges assigned by the 
government to various departments to generate funds in lieu of budget allocations. 
Importantly, such funds are generated in the name of providing public services; hence, 
they are distinguished from privately pocketed bribes (Manion, 1996), illegally extracted 
monies (Lu, 2000), and profits earned by bureau-operated small businesses (Duckett, 
1998).  
Policy awards can come from three sources: the central governmental authority 
(typically the State Council), central-level ministries and commissions, and local party-
state leaders (see also, Manion, 2004, p. 102). Central-level ministries and provincial 
governments enact policy awards that will apply at all levels of government. Sub-
provincial governments can “employ [policy] decisions by upper levels with flexibility” 
(B2008-152). For example, the Anhui provincial government allowed public schools in 
the province to enroll students on a tuition-paying basis, but the condition was that fee-
paying students could not make up more than 70 percent of enrollment (B2008-152). In 
another instance, the Jiangsu provincial government allowed tax bureaus to retain a 
percentage of tax collections as commission. County governments within the province 
may adjust the commission rate based on local economic conditions (B2007-111).10 
Policies devised by upper level authorities powerfully shape local bureaucratic behavior. 
Although some depict local agents as persistently defiant of central policies, local 
authorities reflected that they are in fact “constantly awaiting instructions from above” 
(B2007-51). 
                                                          
10 The situation in Jiangsu constituted a commission—or tax-farming—system, in which the tax 
agencies took a cut of taxes collected, which in turn financed staff benefits. Contrast this to the 
performance pay reform implemented in the U.S. in 1988, under the NPM movement. 
Performance pay was allocated to individual employees based on subjective evaluations of their 
quality of work, not on how much taxes were collected (Marsden & Richardson, 1994). Indeed, it 
would unthinkable for the U.K. tax administration to implement a quasi-tax-farming system!  
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One form of policy awards sanctions the collection of fees and fines. To 
understand how these policies work, earlier reports of bureaucratic predation need to be 
updated in light of new institutional reforms. During the 1980s and 1990s, state agencies 
throughout China were notorious for the problem of “three arbitrary practices” (Manion, 
2004, pp. 101-102; Wedeman, 2000). In township and village governments, the “three 
arbitrary practices” became a source of peasant burdens and protests (Bernstein & Lü, 
2003). Over the last two decades, however, many rationalizing institutional 
improvements were made within the Chinese administration (Yang, 2004). Yet these 
reforms have not abolished prebendal practices; instead, they have made the procedures 
of generating nontax income and public expenditure increasingly routinized and rule-
based.  
As local officials explained, policy awards sanctioning the collection of fees and 
fines range from “soft” to “hard” (B2007-127; B2007-128). According to the 
administrative licensing law, the hardest policies are central and local licensing (xuke) 
provisions. Licensing provisions must have a clear legal justification for collecting fees 
and fines. Licensing provisions require a one-year probation period before they are 
deliberated at the central or local people’s congresses. These provisions become 
permanent only after they are passed. The next softer set of provisions is assessment 
(shenpi) provisions. These are provisions that are not yet passed by the legislature but 
are still legally valid. Finally, the softest policies are “red-stamped documents,” named 
after the bright red department stamp on the letterhead of official state documents. 
These are rules issued by regulatory agencies without higher-level or legislative 
endorsement.  
One example of a hard policy award backing the collection of fees and fines is the 
notorious case of the steamed bun offices in Zhengzhou City of Henan province. 
Zhengzhou City established a Steamed Bun Office at the city level and five in each of the 
county governments below. What do Steam Bun Offices do? City leaders professed a 
need to establish specialized offices to manage steam buns production. The city 
government issued Provision No. 93, titled “Temporary Provisions on Zhengzhou City’s 
Steamed Buns Production and Sales Management.” The provision was passed by the city 
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government’s 14th people’s congress and signed by the mayor. It authorized the Steamed 
Bun Offices to issue steamed bun production permits and to fine producers from 3,000 
to 20,000 yuan for not possessing the permit. This story of Zhengzhou’s steamed bun 
offices illustrates the endorsements from multiple formal institutions that authorize fee 
collection.11  
A second variety of policy awards are monopoly privileges in the provision of 
public or commercialized services. Extra-bureaucracies thrive financially on delivering 
quasi-monopolistic services, such as utilities supply, greening, tour services, media 
publications, private security, administration of examinations, and environmental 
impact assessment. The supply of heat is one example of a completely monopolized 
service. State provisions mandate that heating services for residential and commercial 
properties must be centrally supplied. In one county of Tianjin, the Construction Bureau 
described the Heating Office as its “greasiest” extra-bureaucracy. The Heating Office 
collects 20 yuan for every square meter of property for which heat is supplied. Its income 
could add up to “hundreds of thousands” and “even 10 million dollars a year” (B2008-
144). A similar logic applies to the Greening Office, subordinated to the Forestry Bureau, 
which one bureaucrat described as follows: “The Forestry Bureau regulates greening. It 
can say ‘you cannot touch this tree,’ but then they can touch it themselves” (B2007-108).  
To clarify the source of these monopoly privileges, I extend the concept of policy 
awards to capture revenue-making ties between core bureaus and extra-bureaucracies. 
Core bureaus and extra-bureaucracies share what may be termed a patron-client 
relationship. Extrabureaucracies feed on “administrative protection” provided by their 
supervising bureaus. Such protection may come in the form of explicit legal provisions or 
the covert exercise of political influence (Lam & Perry, 2001; Lin & Zhang, 1999). In 
exchange, extra-bureaucracies often obliged to remit revenue to the core agency or 
simply pay its bills. Relations are so tightly enmeshed that extra-bureaucracies often 
refer to their supervising agency in familial terms as “father,” “mother,” or even “mother-
in-law.”  
                                                          
11 This was reported in “Steamed Bun offices, Watermelon Offices, All Are Troublesome Offices,” 
Xinhua, August 4, 2006.  
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Policy awards may be likened to contracts awarded by the government to public 
bureaucracies to provide services in exchange for the right to generate income from 
office. Following Weber’s historical accounts, policy awards in the Chinese context 
parallels the “prebends” assigned by feudal rulers to unsalaried officials as in-kind 
compensation. However, one key difference between Weber’s descriptions of prebendal 
practices and bureaucratic self-financing in contemporary China is the degree of 
institutionalization and state regulation of these practices. This difference becomes 
evident when we examine the actual procedures of budget allocation within local 
governments.  
 
3.4. Partial Ownership of Income Earned 
While the Chinese bureaucracy is not unusual in its collection of fees and charges, 
it is unusual in that agencies and extra-bureaucracies exercise rightful claims over part 
and even all of the income they generate. In this way, China’s public organizations bear 
some semblance to corporate franchisees in the modern context and tax-farmers in the 
premodern context. Even more unusual is that the agencies exercise income rights 
through the budgeting process. Below I sketch a micro-level view of the budgeting 
process, which leads up to a central observation: in practice—though not in principle—
the size of each office’s budget is directly linked to the amount of nontax revenue 
generated.  
 Determining basic budget allocations. Within each local government, each core 
bureau and its extra-bureaucracies form a collective unit of negotiation during the 
budgeting process. The Finance Bureau has to determine budget allocations for each 
collective unit. It begins by considering the official fiscal category of the bargaining party, 
i.e., whether it is fully, partially, or self-funded. It also evaluates the number of officially 
approved positions (bianzhi), which the government is obliged to finance. The 
Establishment Office assigns a certain number bianzhi to every unit. Individuals 
employed beyond the bianzhi are considered non-official public employees, who will 
normally be excluded from the Finance Bureau’s assessment of a unit’s basic expenditure.  
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During negotiations, the Finance Bureau will adjust actual budget allocations 
based on the ability of a given unit to generate extra, nontax revenue. One Finance 
Officer explained with an analogy: “Budget allocations are supposed to fill a whole cup. 
But if one cup has a tiny pipe [of financial resources] flowing into it, then we [in making 
budget allocations] need not fill the whole cup” (B2007-114). If earning extra revenue 
reduces the sum of a department’s budget allocations, then one may wonder if this 
informal budgeting norm may reduce incentives to generate income. However, recall 
that basic budget allocations are generally modest; so if an agency can generate plenty of 
extra revenue, its net gains will far exceed what the state is able to provide.  
 Centralized deposit of generated revenue. In order for the Finance Bureau to 
make budget allocations, it must first command accurate information about the amount 
of nontax revenue that each department earns. And in order for audit and disciplinary 
authorities to prevent arbitrary and excessive extraction of monies among local agencies, 
there needs to be mechanisms in place to track the collection and spending of public 
revenue. Such mechanisms of fiscal control and management were weak or virtually non-
existent during the 1980s and 1990s. Local agencies simply “collected and spent” 
(zuoshou zuozhi), with minimal oversight from the higher levels or financial authorities. 
This is why during the early decades of reform, practices of bureaucratic self-financing 
became synonymous with corruption and illegal behavior—an impression that continues 
to stick.  
 However, when Zhu Rongji came to office as Premier in 1998, he launched a 
comprehensive program to modernize the bureaucracy. Among the many reforms 
implemented, the creation of a centralized treasury management account is one of the 
most significant institutional changes and perhaps also least understood (OMIT, 2009). 
Traditionally, state bank accounts were fragmented not only between levels of 
government but also between departments at each level. Under the traditional system, 
bureaucracies were allowed to set up individual transitory accounts, known popularly as 
“small treasuries” (Wedeman, 2000), to deposit collected monies. As these accounts 
were fragmented, it was nearly impossible for finance authorities to track monetary flows, 
much less control them.  
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Through the treasury management reform, which was first piloted at the central 
level and then gradually extended to the sub-national levels, the reformers took the first 
step of working with banks to abolish transitory accounts. Henceforth, all public 
organizations were required to submit revenue collections directly into a consolidated 
treasury account, which included a separate account for nontax revenue. At both the 
central and local levels, direct payment systems were established that allowed finance 
authorities within each level to make payments to vendors on behalf of various 
departments, thereby eliminating cash transactions that were notoriously difficult to 
trace. Cashless payment schemes were also introduced. Every city and county was 
required to establish a one-stop Administrative Services Center, where citizens paid 
administrative and service fees at on-site banks, which were remitted directly into 
treasury accounts, instead of paying cash to street-level bureaucrats.  
To be clear, the post-1998 administrative reforms cannot completely eradicate 
the theft or misuse of public funds. After all, even in developed nations, mechanisms of 
fiscal and budgetary control are imperfect. Nevertheless, the incorporation of technology 
and reduction of cash payments improved state control over the finances of myriad 
bureaucracies to a degree that could not have been accomplished in earlier decades. 
These changes set the stage for the adaptation of budgetary norms within local 
governments. 
Pegging revenue to budget allocations in practice. One major budgetary reform 
accompanying the creation of a centralized treasury management system is known as 
“separating revenue and expenditure” (shouzhi liangtiaoxian). In principle, this policy 
aimed to delink budgetary allocations from the amount of revenue earned, and in doing 
so, remove extractive incentives. One observer concludes optimistically: “With the 
emphasis on the separation of revenue and expenditure, government agencies or 
institutions that collect fees and levies no longer take in the funds themselves… the 
agencies or offices [that] collected the funds generally lost the right to dispose of the 
funds collected” (Yang, 2004, p. 240). In fact, my interviews reveal a different logic at 
work. 
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Despite dramatically improved budgetary control by financial authorities, 
individual agencies continued to expect a full or partial “refund” of their income earned 
in the form of budget allocations. The term “refund” is a direct translation of the Chinese 
word fanhuan. To “refund” does not mean that the Finance Bureau physically returns 
funds to the respective offices. Rather, “refund” refers to an internal and typically 
unwritten budgeting rule, wherein the Finance Bureau keeps track of each agency’s 
earnings (also termed “pots”) and then approves budgetary spending based on the size of 
the pots. One Finance Officer detailed this procedure with an example (B2008-139):   
 
Say the Price Bureau collects administrative fees. After the fees are collected, they 
are deposited in an earmarked treasury account. But the right to spend those 
funds remains with the Price Bureau. If the bureau wishes to use the funds to 
make a purchase, they have to submit a request to the Finance Bureau. If the 
purchase request is reasonable, we will approve it. However, the spending rights 
will always remain with individual agencies. The role of the Finance Bureau is to 
help them deposit and monitor these funds.  
 
In other words, although individual departments may not have direct access to their 
bank accounts, following the onset of centralized budgetary management, each 
department continues to exercise “spending rights” (shiyong quan) over the income it 
earns. Recalling Weber’s description of prebendalism, this is a concrete display of the 
“ownership of the means of production or administration” by public agencies—albeit 
modified in the Chinese context by higher state capacity of bureaucratic monitoring and 
control.  
My interviews suggest that with the exception of entirely self-funded units, most 
agencies can only exercise partial spending rights. A portion of their revenue had to be 
surrendered to a general fund for budgetary relocation by the Finance Bureau. The so-
called “refund” rate varies by location and by units within each location. For example, in 
one county in Jiangsu, all the units were promised a uniform 70 percent refund (B2007-
111; B2007-114; B2007-116; B2007-117); in other words, these organizations could count 
on spending up to 70 percent of their income. In another county in Tianjin, the rate 
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varied from 50 to 100 percent by department (B2008-139). Generally, unused funds may 
be rolled over (B2007-114; 115; 116; 117). Income generated by these offices constitutes, 
in a real sense, “surpluses,” and not merely “slack,” (savings from budget allocations), as 
Moe describes in the context of American bureaucracy (1984, p. 748).  
The key question, of course, is why the Finance Bureau would continue to peg 
budget allocations to revenue earned if collected monies are deposited in a centralized 
account and under their direct control? The answer is a simple incentive problem. As one 
Finance Officer explained, “The financial burden of our county would be too large 
otherwise. If we agreed to fund all the departments fully, then they would have no 
motivation to generate revenue for themselves” (B2007-114). Indeed, a related and 
intriguing insight offered by another Finance Officer is that the security of refund 
agreements between the Finance Bureau and other offices was correlated with local 
financial pressures. He explained that for cultural reasons, Chinese people tend to avoid 
putting verbal agreements down in writing; however, written documents that guarantees 
the refund procedure “definitely exists” in poor central and western locales. Why is that? 
In his words, “If rules are written down, incentives are stronger” (B2010-214). Put 
differently, financially strapped locales face greater need for their agencies to self-finance, 
which leads these local governments to be willing to provide formal and stronger 
property rights.  
Greasy vs. Distilled Water Agencies. Returning to my opening anecdote of the 
county government in Shandong, it should be no surprise that some agencies are openly 
wealthier than others, even within a single locale. Even though the allocation of budgets 
for basic expenditure and civil service pay is uniform across departments, some 
departments enjoy larger budgets and more lavish staff benefits. Colloquially, wealthy 
organizations like the Construction Bureau and its extra-bureaucracies are known as 
“greasy offices” (youshui yamen), whereas those with pittance budgets are dubbed 
“distilled water offices” (qingshui yamen). Some observers claim that Chinese agencies 
are not afraid to show off their consumption because the central government deliberately 
tolerates “embezzlement” in order to deter bribery (Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2010). Such a 
claim misunderstands the internal bureaucratic rules and context in China. Agencies like 
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the Construction Bureau do not need to hide their relative opulence because they 
exercise rightful claims to the abundant income they generate from public office.  
4. Conclusion 
 
This article proposes an alternative ideal-type of bureaucracy, termed bureau-
franchising.  I illustrate four concrete features of this model by drawing on my field 
investigations in China. Whereas the Weberian model is an ideal-type that features low 
opportunistic risks but low-powered incentives, the bureau-franchising model offers 
high-powered incentives but presents high opportunistic risks. Insights from neo-
institutional economics suggest that no single organizational form is universally ideal. 
Weber is right that legal-rational bureaucracy provides the best fit with modern capitalist 
markets, which demands predictable administration. In developed economies like the 
U.S., public bureaucracies are generally expected to perform routine tasks in an 
accountable and rule-abiding manner. However, in developing and transitional 
economies like China, the realities are starkly different. Public agencies are constantly 
constrained; they struggle to make ends meet. And in China, state agents are expected to 
go beyond performing routine responsibilities; they are tasked to be entrepreneurial and 
to devise unorthodox, daring ways to cope with novel and fast-evolving challenges. The 
vastly different demands placed on bureaucracy in established economies, as compared 
to developing economies, may thus call for different administrative structures in each 
context.  
Having said that, I must clarify that by “ideal-type,” I certainly do not mean an 
ideal—desirable—organization. Ideal-types serve an analytic (“this is what it would look 
like if certain attributes are taken to the extreme”) but not prescriptive function (“we 
should all adopt this model”). As Weber himself stresses, ideal-types “are to be 
considered merely border cases which are of special and indispensable analytical value, 
and bracket historical reality which almost always appears in mixed forms” (1968, p. 
1002). The bureau-franchising model as seen in China has many problems, which the 
government, until this day, is still trying to manage. While public employees may be 
powerfully motivated to be entrepreneurial and financially independent, the risks of 
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extraction and rent-seeking are constantly present. Especially in the provision of public 
services like education and health care, the Chinese bureaucracy is characteristically 
profit-oriented, which has exacerbated unequal access to essential services and irked 
citizens.  
To use Yingqi Qian’s (2003) term, is the bureau-franchising model a “transitional 
institution,” which one expects to eventually fade away and transition into the Weberian 
type? This is a critical question, and one that I elaborate upon in a separate book (OMIT 
2016). My short answer is that the bureau-franchising model does transition away—but 
this transition takes place across different parts of China at different times and speed. 
Twenty years ago in Shanghai, the bureaucracy closely approximated the bureau-
franchising model. Cadres of all ranks were powerfully motivated to pursue economic 
gains, which mitigated financial constraints, rapidly stimulated the economy, but also led 
to extractive problems. Then, as markets grew, local governments in Shanghai became 
the forerunners of bureaucratic reforms. Today, Shanghai displays a structure of 
bureaucracy that is more consistent with Weberian norms. For example, district and 
county governments in Shanghai can afford to fund bureaucracy adequately and thus 
dispense with prebendal practices. However, even in Shanghai, it would be a mistake to 
think that its bureaucracy has become wholly Weberian. Even among developed nations, 
categorically different varieties of legal-rational bureaucracy exist. Shanghai’s 
bureaucracy may have shed its prebendal past, but it retains certain characteristics—
such as the deliberate fusion of party and administration—that is decisively not 
Weberian.  
One might further ask if other developing countries also display variants of 
bureau-franchising, as I have described in China. Yes, it does. We usually shrug it off as 
“normalized” corruption. Police corruption in Nigeria is a case in point. In typical 
prebendal manner, the Nigerian police have been “subjected to a perpetual crisis of 
underfunding” (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 258). Not surprisingly, rank-and-file officers have 
resorted to bribery and extortion to self-finance. While such descriptions are common 
throughout the developing world, the crucial differences in China are several-fold: 
prebendal activities were carried out at the agency, rather than individual, level; they 
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became progressively sanctioned and regulated, rather than lawless; and rather than 
pretend that budgetary problems do not exist, the high-powered incentives of self-
financing, though risky, were activated to spur revenue-generation among state agencies. 
By contrast, regulatory agencies in the developed world, even when they adopt “private 
sector” practices (such as by outsourcing services or paying for performance), do not in 
fact seek to profit themselves or their organizations through the exercise of power 
(Majone & Baake, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Indeed, according to the norms of 
developed countries, such actions would incur charges of corruption and be swiftly 
punished.  
The broader purpose of this article is to underscore the unique problems and 
characteristics of public administration in developing countries. Normally, when 
observers find deviations from standard best practices in developing countries, such 
deviations are written off as corruption, and the administrations in these countries 
would be asked to clean up their acts by adopting Weberian norms. Such policy 
prescriptions often make things worse because, as Riggs points out, the bureaucracies 
end up adopting only the formality of best practices while retaining informal coping 
mechanisms. The recurrent result is what some policy experts term “capability traps” 
(Pritchett & de Weijer, 2011). In recent years, such problems have again risen to the fore 
in criticisms of foreign aid and reform programs that assume a single standard of good 
governance (Fukuyama, 2004; Jomo & Chowdhury, 2012; Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004). 
Scholars of public policy need to develop alternative conceptual frameworks and 
language in order to comprehend “what does in fact exist” in the administrations of 
developing countries. Only then may we craft policies that fit the realities of these 
societies.  
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Figure 1: Bureau-Franchising: Mixing Market and Hierarchical Features 
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Figure 2: Local government revenue and spending before and after 1994 
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Table 1: The Weberian Model vs. Bureau-Franchising 
 
 Market Structure Hierarchical Structure 
Advantage High-powered incentives 
 
Low-powered incentives 
Disadvantage High opportunistic risks 
 
Low opportunistic risks 
Corporate 
Organization 
Outsource services to other firms 
on the market 
Within-firm supply of services 
Public  
Organization 
Bureau-franchising model 
(partially or fully self-funded 
public employees who own the 
means of administration) 
 
Weberian model 
(fully state-funded public 
employees who do not own the 
means of administration) 
Personnel skills 
privileged 
Entrepreneurial, self-motivated, 
risk-taking 
Rule-abiding, honest,  
predictable 
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Table 2: Extra-bureaucracies under selected bureaus and by funding category 
 
Core Bureau Selected Extra-bureaucracies  Funding Category 
Party hierarchy  
Party committee 
office  
Party history research office  State-funded  
 Archives office State-funded 
 Service center for inspecting methods of 
protecting confidential data 
Self-funded  
Publicity office Lecturing team State-funded 
 Newsroom Self-funded 
State hierarchy 
Legal affairs 
office  
Office of arbitration committees Partially state-funded 
 Legal services center Partially state-funded 
Economic and 
trade commission 
Energy inspection station Partially state-funded 
 Management office of the electronics sector State-funded 
 Chemicals research institute  Partially state-funded 
Transportation 
bureau 
Station for monitoring traffic volume  Self-funded 
 Management center for the Great River 
Expressway 
Self-funded 
 Management center for the 105 National 
Expressway 
Self-funded  
Health bureau  Center for Health Inspection State-funded 
 Blood center Self-funded  
 City hospital  Partially state-funded 
 
Source: Yearbook of the Establishment Office of Liaocheng City, Shandong Province 
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Table 3: Public employees by funding category, 2003 
(Percentage over total indicated in parenthesis) 
 
 Partially or fully 
state-funded  
Entirely self-
funded 
TOTAL 
 
Core bureaus 
(jiguan danwei) 
8,926,450 96,733 9,023,183 
(19.4%) 
Extra-bureaucracies 
(shiye danwei) 
35,199,835 2,312,272 37,512,107 
(80.6%) 
TOTAL 
 
44,126,285 
(94.8%) 
2,409,005 
(5.2%) 
46,535,290 
 
Source: Local Public Financial Statistics  
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Table 4: Six categories of nontax revenue collected by local bureaucracies 
 
Item  Examples 
Earmarked revenue  Pollution levies; education surcharges; revenue from 
lotteries  
Administrative and user 
charges  
Various licensing fees; registration fees  
Fines  Fines by public security, commerce, and family planning 
bureaus  
Profits from operating state 
assets  
Investment income from state assets  
Profits from charges for use of 
state assets  
Rental income  
Other revenue  Donations; township self-raised funds  
 
Source: State Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure Catalog (2008), Ministry of Finance 
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The study of public administration in developing countries requires that we look beyond 
the Weberian model as the only ideal-type of bureaucracy. When we assume that there 
exists only one gold standard of public administration, all other organizational forms 
that do not fit the Weberian ideal are written off as corruption or failures. Drawing on 
neo-institutional economics, I introduce an alternative ideal-type of bureaucracy found 
in China. Termed bureau-franchising, this model combines the hierarchical structure of 
bureaucracy with the high-powered incentives of franchising. In this system, public 
agencies can rightfully claim a share of income earned to finance and reward themselves, 
like entrepreneurial franchisees. Yet distinguished from lawless corruption, this self-
financing (or prebendal) behavior is sanctioned and even deliberately incentivized by 
state rules. Although such a model violates several Weberian tenets of “good” 
bureaucracy, it harnesses and regulates the high-powered incentives of prebendalism to 
ameliorate budgetary and capacity constraints common to developing countries like 
China.  
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